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SOME LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES IN THE




The Cuban government seized a great amount of real and
personal property from its citizens and others during the first
decade of the Cuban revolution. This Article examines legal
issues that the Cuban government will need to address as it
seeks to resolve the outstanding claims of its citizens brought
in response to these seizures. In addition, the Article reviews
the decisions regarding eligible recipients, procedures, and
forms of compensation that will need to be made in developing
a program of remedies for the past expropriations. This
examination is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather
illustrative of the complexity of the problem.
An underlying assumption of this Article is that in its
transition to a free-market economy, Cuba will provide a
remedy, whether restitution or another form of redress, to
those whose property was seized by the Revolutionary
government after 1959 and who have not yet received
compensation for the taking.' This assumption is based on
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1 The term "restitution" is sometimes used, particularly by European
writers, to encompass all types of remedies for uncompensated property
takings. For the purposes of this Article, however, the term restitution is
synonymous with the return of the expropriated property to its original
owners.
The issue of whether to provide a remedy for property losses is still
being debated. It has been noted, in the context of restitution of
expropriated assets to their former owners in post-Communist Eastern
European countries, that any argument for giving a remedy to the victims
of property takings must successfully demonstrate: (1) that the
expropriations were unlawful or illegitimate; (2) that there exists a duty in
a successor government to rectify the injustices of the old regime; and (3)
(217)Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
the requirements of Cuban law, fundamental notions of
fairness, and the belief that the resolution of these property
disputes is a necessary step towards achieving political and
economic stability.2
that this duty takes precedence over other potentially conflicting duties. See
Claus Offe & Frank Bonker, A Forum on Restitution, E. EUR. CONST. REV.,
Summer 1993, 30, 30-31. Offe and Bdnker argue that, at a minimum, the
third test has generally not been met in Eastern Europe, where "all kinds
of arbitrary interests, privileges, and resentments have governed the actual
practice of restitution," and that remedy for property loss has been given,
whereas redress for non-property losses has not, because of "the strategic
importance attached to property reform and the greater political leverage
of former property owners compared with other victims of the Communist
regime." Id. at 31.
It has also been asserted that there is no legal or moral basis for
providing a remedy for property losses and not compensating those who
have suffered all torts, including "involuntary or uncompensated work,
unjust imprisonment, loss of life or limb, loss of loved ones, physical or
psychological abuse and harassment by agents of the state, [and]
discontinuance of pension payments" at the hands of the Cuban
Government. Rolando H. Castafieda & George Plinio Montalvdn, Transition
in Cuba: A Comprehensive Stabilization Proposal and Some Key Issues, in
CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 11,
25 (1993). The authors conclude that because the cost of providing
compensation for tort claims "defies imagination," no remedies should be
provided for either tort or property claims. Id. at 25, 30. See also Jorge A.
Sanguinetty, The Transition Towards a Market Economy in Cuba: Its Legal
and Managerial Dimensions, in TRANSITION IN CUBA: NEW CHALLENGES
FOR U.S. POLICY 669, 692-696 (Lisandro Perez ed., 1993) (suggesting that
resolution of the property claims issue be deferred until Cuba's economy has
recovered, but pointing out that a formula for the settlement of claims must
be determined early in Cuba's transition to a free-market society); Rudi
Dornbusch, Getting Ready for Cuba After Castro, Bus. WK., May 24, 1993,
at 19 (arguing against restitution on the grounds that it would result in
court deadlocks over conflicting claims to property and delays in
privatization).
2 One scholar analyzing the philosophy behind restitution programs
raises the following question: "[tiaken together, the economic and moral
arguments against restitution seem unbeatable. Nevertheless, restitution
is going on, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Lithuania
and elsewhere. Parliamentarians have been overriding the advice of
economists and moral philosophers. Why?" Stephen Holmes, A Forum on
Restitution, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Summer 1993, at 32, 33. Holmes answers
this question by concluding that restitution is perhaps morally wrong but
politically correct, and propounds the following thesis:
[E]ven if restitution is both economically inefficient and morally
unjust, it is good policy if it can indirectly support democratization
by helping legitimate the fledgling property system. It can do this,
in turn, by helping break the pernicious monopoly of the former
nomenklatura on the appropriation of state assets. This is one good
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This Article does not present a proposal to resolve the
outstanding property claims of Cuban citizens. Several
specific proposals on this issue already have been developed,'
and Cuban exile and dissident groups have presented a variety
of views on the subject.4 It is likely, however, that the
economic and political climate in Cuba at the time it decides
to address the problem will dictate the approach taken. Such
conditions cannot be predicted at this time, and there is no
evidence that Cuba is prepared to address the issue in the
immediate future.
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF CUBA'S EXPROPRIATIONS AND
RESULTING CLAIMS
Although Cuba began expropriating foreign-owned property
on the island in 1959, most of the expropriations occurred in
the second half of 1960.' In a parallel process, most assets
owned by Cuban nationals, except for small parcels of land,
homes, and personal items, were expropriated at various times
between 1959 and 1968.' Additionally, beginning in 1961,
reason, which plays a role alongside the bad ones, for parliamentary
support for restitution throughout the region.
Id. (emphasis omitted). A similar conclusion has been reached by other
writers who have analyzed the claims resolution process in Central and
Eastern Europe. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of
Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 315, 317 (1993) (arguing that "the distributive impact of
reprivatization either will be minimal, or will bear little resemblance to the
goals articulated in the laws and the public debates of their passage[, thus
suggesting] that reprivatization is a creature of succession politics and that
its primary function is ideological").
' See, e.g., Nicolas Sanchez, A Proposal for the Return of Expropriated
Cuban Properties to their Original Owners, Address at the Fourth Annual
Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy 1 (Aug.
1994) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Business Law) (attempting to define "the position of the exiled Cuban
community [regarding] the return" of expropriated properties).
4 Poll Results: How do Cuba's Dissident and Exile Groups Envisage
Cuba's Economic Future?, LA SOCIEDAD ECONOMICA, Bull. 38 (Dec. 6, 1993).
" For a description of the process by which Cuba expropriated the assets
of U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals, see MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE
CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-
108 (1976).
' For a summary of Cuba's expropriations of the assets of its nationals,
see Nicolas J. Gutierrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property
Rights: Castro's Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba (1994)
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Cubans leaving the country had all their property confiscated
as they departed.7
In 1964, the U.S. Congress amended the Foreign Claims
Settlement Act to establish a Cuban Claims Program, under
which the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the
United States ("FCSC") was given the authority to determine
and certify the validity and amount of claims by U.S. nationals
against the Cuban government for the taking of their
property.' The Cuban Claims Program was active between
1966 and 1972. During that time, it received 8,816 claims:
1,146 by U.S. corporations and 7,670 by individual U.S.
citizens.' It certified 5,911 of these claims, with an aggregate
amount of $1.8 billion; denied 1,195 claims, with an aggregate
amount of $1.5 billion; and dismissed without consideration (or
saw withdrawn) 1,710 other claims.'0
Although the Cuban Claims Act did not expressly authorize
the inclusion of interest in the amount allowed, the FCSC
determined that statutory simple interest at a 6% rate should
be imposed on the claims it certified." Applying this interest
rate to the outstanding $1.8 billion principal yields a present
value, as of January 1995, of about $5.6 billion in certified
U.S. nationals' claims against Cuba.
12
The expropriation claims by citizens of other countries were
much smaller than those of U.S. and Cuban citizens. For the
(Address at the American Bar Association's 1994 Annual Meeting, New
Orleans, La.), reprinted in 1 LATIN AM. Bus. L. ALERT 5 (1994).
' Ley 989, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 23,705 (Dec. 6, 1961)
[hereinafter Ley 9891.
s 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1988) (amended in 1994).
9 FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE CUBAN
CLAIMS PROGRAM, at 412 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 FCSC REPORT].
"* Id. The value of the certified claims is almost double the $956 million
book value of all U.S. investments in Cuba through the end of 1959, as
reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Jos6 F. Alonso & Armando
M. Lago, A First Approximation of the Foreign Assistance Requirements of
a Democratic Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE
CUBAN ECONOMY 168, 201 (1993).
1 1972 FCSC REPORT, supra note 9, at 76. The interest rate, if any, that
should be applied to the amounts certified by the FCSC would most likely
be subject to negotiation between the United States and Cuba.
" See Alonso & Lago, supra note 10, at 201. This amount includes
neither the value of those claims disallowed for lack of adequate proof, nor
those not submitted to the FCSC during the period specified in the statute.
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most part, these claims have been settled through agreements
between Cuba and the respective countries (e.g., Spain,
France, Switzerland, and Canada).1" In general, these claims
have been settled at a fraction of the assessed value of the
expropriated assets.'4
The aggregate amount of the expropriation claims by
Cuban nationals has not been quantified precisely, but is
likely to be many times that of U.S. citizens' claims, given the
comprehensive nature of the Cuban government's
expropriations. One "crude estimate" of the Cuban national
expropriation claims puts their aggregate value at $7 billion,
not including interest. 5
The outstanding property claims of both U.S. and Cuban
nationals raise an important issue that will need to be
addressed in the early stages of Cuba's free-market transition.
There are several reasons why the early resolution of this
issue is urgent: (1) U.S. laws require resolution of U.S. citizen
expropriation claims before foreign aid can resume; 6 (2) the
Cuban government will need to give early resolution to the
outstanding expropriation claims to assure domestic order and
1 See Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement of Claims for Expropriated
Foreign Private Property Between Cuba and Foreign Nations Other than the
United States, 5 LAW. AM. 457 (1973). Gordon observes that Cuba's
settlements with other countries "[do] not suggest a Cuban recognition of a
right to compensation under either Cuban or international law, but rather
an intention to settle claims as a condition precedent to the development or
continuation of trade patterns with specific nations." Id. at 467.
14 The Spanish claims, for example, were valued at $350 million but were
ultimately settled for about $40 million. Even this limited amount was not
paid until 1994, three decades after the claims accrued. See Cuba to
Compensate Spaniards for Property Seizures, REUTER TEXTLINE, Feb. 15,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
1" Alonso & Lago, supra note 10, at 202-04.
16 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (1988) (amended 1994). See generally Matias
P. Travieso-Diaz, Requirements for Lifting the U.S. Trade Embargo Against
Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN
ECONOMY 222 (1993) (discussing the requirements which must be met before
the U.S. embargo may be lifted). Recently introduced legislation to provide
aid to a transition government in Cuba expressly ratifies the prohibition
against helping Cuba until the U.S. citizen expropriation claims are
resolved. Free and Independent Cuba Assistance Act, H.R. 611, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(d)(2) (1995); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, 5.381, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 206(6); H.R. 927,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 207 (7) (1995) [hereinafter LIBERTAD Act].
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political and economic stability, expedite privatization, and
foster foreign investment; 17 and (3) resolution of the claims
issue will diminish the perceived political risks of investing in
Cuba. Political risks are a matter of concern to prospective
investors, traders, and financial institutions."8
The expropriation claims by U.S. nationals and Cuban
citizens have separate legal and political bases and may have
to be addressed differently by the Cuban government. U.S.
claims are based on well-recognized international law
principles that require "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation to aliens whose property is confiscated. 9 As a
practical matter, U.S. citizens' claims are also backed by
express U.S. policy dating back to President Kennedy, under
which settlement of U.S. nationals' expropriation claims is
cited as a precondition to the normalization of U.S.-Cuba
relations and the lifting of the trade embargo.2 °
17 All countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have implemented
schemes to settle expropriation claims have experienced a great deal of
uncertainty over property rights. This uncertainty has discouraged
potential investors and has delayed privatization efforts. Cheryl W. Gray
et al., Evolving Legal Frameworks for Private Sector Development in
Central and Eastern Europe 4 (1993) (World Bank Discussion Paper No.
209). While it appears inevitable that the claims resolution process will
have some impact on Cuba's economic transition, the rapid development of
a claims resolution plan would help minimize this impact.
18 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign
Investment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Scheme, 21 INT'L LAW. 671, 685-88 (1987).
'" Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (Cl. Ct. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 185-90 (1965). It
has been held by U.S. courts that Cuba's expropriations of the assets of U.S.
nationals violated international lawbecause Cubafailed to provide adequate
compensation, and because it carried the expropriations out in a
discriminatory manner against U.S. citizens. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166, 184-85 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). See generally Juan C.
Consuegra-Barquin, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership Dilemma: A
Human Rights Issue Under International Law, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 873
(1994) (discussing the difficulties that a transition government will face in
re-establishing a system of private property rights and restitution in Cuba).
"0 See, e.g., Lisa Shuchman, U.S. Won't Ease Embargo Against Cuba,
Official Says, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 29, 1994, at 5B (quoting Dennis Hays,
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, U.S. Department of State, as saying that
before the United States lifts the trade embargo against Cuba, the
expropriation of U.S.-owned property by the Cuban government will have
to be addressed); Frank J. Prial, U.N. Votes to Urge U.S. to Dismantle
Embargo on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al (quoting Alexander
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By contrast, international law principles do not provide a
remedy to domestic claimants for the expropriation of their
assets by their government."' The resolution of the Cuban
nationals' expropriation claims, therefore, will have to be
handled in accordance with Cuban laws."
Watson, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, as stating in an
address to the General Assembly of the United Natiohs that the United
States chooses not to trade with Cuba because "among other things Cuba,
'in violation of international law, expropriated billions of dollars worth of
private property belonging to U.S. individuals and has refused to make
reasonable restitution").
2 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d at 185; Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds,
376 U.S. 398 (1964); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209,
215 (N.D. Ill. 1982); F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 Many Cuban nationals whose properties were seized by the Cuban
government subsequently moved to the United States and became U.S.
citizens. Some of these Cuban-Americans advocate being added to the U.S.
claimants class (so they can be included in an eventual U.S.-Cuba
settlement) or, alternatively, being recognized as not bound by an agreement
between the U.S. and Cuba and being permitted to pursue their claims in
U.S. courts. See, e.g., Alberto Diaz-Masvidal, Scope, Nature and
Implications on Contract Assignments of Cuban Natural Resources (Mineral
and Petroleum), Address at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Association
for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 54-62 (Aug. 1994) (on file with the
Journal).
A bill recently introduced in the U.S. Congress would provide the relief
sought by the above-mentioned Cuban-Americans. The proposed legislation
would: (1) amend the Cuba Claims Act to allow U.S. citizens to file
expropriation claims against Cuba with the FCSC, whether or not the
claimants were U.S. citizens at the time of expropriation, and (2) enable any
U.S. citizen whose property was confiscated by Cuba to bring action in U.S.
district courts against any third-country person or government that
"traffics"in (i.e., sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, purchases, receives,
possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or disposes of) the expropriated
property. LIBERTAD Act, supra note 16, §§ 4(7), 302, 303.
There is some precedent for including the claims of individuals who
were not U.S. citizens at the time the expropriations in the settlement of
U.S. claims against another country. Such an inclusion would require
legislation amending the Cuban Claims Act along the lines of the
LIBERTAD Act or the bill that was passed by Congress in 1955 to include
individuals who were U.S. citizens as of August 1955 in the U.S. war claims
against Italy. See 22 U.S.C. § 1641c (1988). Enactment of such legislation,
however, may be opposed by the existing certified U.S. claimants, whose
share of a lump settlement would decrease if the claimant class were
enlarged and the negotiated settlement amount was less than the certified
value of the claims. In addition, such legislation would raise numerous legal
questions, including its potential inconsistency with well settled
international law principles under which a state can only act to protect the
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interests of those who were nationals of that state at the time of the
expropriations. See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-56 (2d ed. 1970).
An analyst identified additional problems raised by legislation like the
LIBERTAD Act:
Passage of such legislation would pose additional uncertainties for
anyone contemplating the purchase of Cuban assets. If Congress
were to open the U.S. courts, or the FCSC, to such claims and
provide funding, U.S. citizens now bound by the original Cuban
Claims Act ana the determination of the FCSC would clamor for
equal treatment. Given the current emphasis on deficit reduction,
it is unlikely that such legislation would include funding by the
Congress. But, without funding, a new set of claims would cast
further doubts over any negotiations with a newly democratic Cuba.
Absent an agreement by a new government of Cuba and the United
States to establish a tribunal, perhaps along the lines of the Iran-
United States Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague, these claimants may
be without a remedy or a forum in which to pursue a remedy.
Robert C. Helander, Creditors' Rights: Claims Against Cuban Confiscated
Assets, in INVESTING IN CUBA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 37, 42 (1994).
Another potential approach to protecting the interests of Cuban
expropriation victims who are now U.S. citizens would be to make express
provisions in the claims settlement agreement between the United States
and Cuba for setting aside moneys for the compensation of individuals who
were not U.S. citizens at the time of the takings. Most interesting in this
respect is the treatment in the U.S.-Czechoslovakia Claims Settlement
Agreement of claims from persons whose property was expropriated by
Czechoslovakia and who subsequently became naturalized U. S. citizens.
(The U.S.-Czechoslovakia Agreement laid to rest all claims of U.S. citizens
against Czechoslovakia for expropriations carried out between 1945 and
1981; Czechoslovakia agreed to pay a lump sum of $81.5 million to be
distributed to U.S. claimants, whereas the United States agreed to return
to Czechoslovakia 18.4 metric tons of monetary gold, worth $250 million,
recovered from the Nazis after World War II, and also agreed to release
blocking control over properties and interests of Czechoslovakia in the
United States). Vratislav Pechota, The 1981 U.S.-Czechoslovak Claims
Settlement Agreement: An Epilogue to Postwar Nationalization and
Expropriation Disputes, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 & n.8 (1982).
The agreement contains a provision that sets aside a portion of the
settlement for "persons who were not U.S. citizens when their property was
nationalized." Id. at 649. The provision applies to persons whose property
was expropriated between 1945 and 1948 and who had become U.S. citizens
by 1948. Id Inclusion of such provision was strongly opposed by the U.S.
Department of State, which wrote to Congress stating that:
[u]nder well-established principles of international law, to which
the United States adheres, the United States cannot espouse claims
against foreign governments for injuries inflicted upon persons who
were not U.S. citizens at the time of the injury.... Deviation from
the established legal principles cited above would create a
precedent with implications beyond this immediate case. It could
open a broad range of new and marginal claims for the U.S.
Government to pursue, without support under international law.
At the same time, it would erode our ability to espouse legitimate
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3. How U.S. CITIZENS' CLAIMS MAY BE RESOLVED
Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article, the potential resolution of the expropriation claims of
U.S. nationals needs to be acknowledged briefly because the
Cuban government may be under political pressure to treat
U.S. and Cuban property claims uniformly. In addition, the
nature and amount of a U.S.-Cuba settlement may limit the
options available to the Cuban government when settling the
claims of Cuban nationals.
The President of the United States has wide, but not
plenary, power to settle claims against foreign governments
who take property belonging to U.S. citizens without
compensation."3 The President has delegated authority to
the U.S. State Department to act on behalf of U.S. claimants
in the negotiation of their claims against an expropriating
country. 4 Under the doctrine of espousal, the settlement
resulting from the negotiations conducted by the State
Department is binding on the claimants and constitutes their
claims of U.S. citizens in the face of worthless undertakings by a
foreign government to provide compensation.
Letter from Richard Fairbanks, Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations, to Charles Percy, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, (Oct. 2, 1981), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 211, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4, 5 (1981). Congress nonetheless enacted legislation implementing
a settlement agreement that set aside a portion of the settlement proceeds
for individuals whose property was taken between 1945 and 1948 and whose
claims had been previously turned down by the FCSC because they were not
U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscations. In doing so, however,
Congress reaffirmed the existing U.S. practice and clarified that "[i]n
making payments under this section, the Congress does not establish any
precedent for future claims payments." Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-127 § 6(2)(B), 95 Stat. 1675, 1677.
While the Czechoslovakian settlement is thus not a direct precedent for
providing a remedy to Cuban-born claimants who have become U.S. citizens,
it could serve as a model for analogous legislation relating to a settlement
between the United States and Cuba. The obstacles to such legislation
would be the same as those discussed above.
23 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); Shanghai Power
Co., 4 Cl. Ct. at 244-45. The President's authority is limited, however, by
the rarely exercised power of Congress to enact legislation requiring
renegotiation of a settlement which it considers unfavorable. See Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 687-88.
14 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680 n.9, for alisting often settlement
agreements entered into by the U.S. Department of State with foreign
countries between 1952 and 1979.
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sole remedy.25 The United States and the expropriating
country typically arrive at a settlement involving a lump sum
payment by the expropriating country that is a fraction of the
total estimated value of the confiscated assets."  The
settlement proceeds are then distributed among the claimants
in proportion to their losses. In most cases, the settlement
does not include accrued interest. A 1992 settlement with
Germany concerning East Germany's expropriations of assets
belonging to U.S. nationals, however, included the payment of
simple interest from the time the U.S. properties were
taken.2
Usually, U.S. claimants may not opt out of the settlement
reached by the U.S. government, nor may they pursue their
claims before U.S. courts or tribunals of the settling
country.28 It may be possible, however, to reach a settlement
agreement with Cuba that would remove these impediments
and allow individual claimants to pursue alternative remedies,
such as negotiating separately with the Cuban government for
restitution of expropriated assets, investment concessions, or
payments in cash or government obligations.2"
265 See id. at 679-80; Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States,
735 F.2d 1517, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 1 RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H.
WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMs: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM
AGREEMENTS 6 (1975).
26 For example, the United States settled U.S. claims against the People's
Republic of China for $80.5 million, which was about 40% of the $197
million certified by the FCSC. Agreement on the Settlement of Claims, May
11, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 18 I.L.M. 551, 551; Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct. at
239.
27 Letter from Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant Legal Advisor for
International Claims and Investment Disputes, U.S. Department of State,
to German Democratic Republic Claimants (May 29, 1992) (on file with the
Journal); Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property
Claims, May 13, 1992, U.S.-F.R.G., T.I.A.S. 11,959 [hereinafter Agreement].
28 See Shanghai Power, 4 Cl. Ct. at 244.
298 There is some precedent for such flexibility. The recent U.S.
settlement agreement with Germany, for example, allows U.S. nationals to
forego their portions of the settlement amount and instead pursue their
claims under Germany's domestic property claims program. Agreement,
supra note 27, art. 3; 57 Fed. Reg. 53,175, 53,175-76 (1992).
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4. RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN NATIONALS' CLAIMS
4.1. Introduction
Resolution of Cuban nationals' expropriation claims is a
political issue as well as a legal one. From a legal standpoint,
the inquiry made is into the legal validity and effectiveness of
the expropriations under applicable Cuban law at the time of
the takings. If the expropriations were lawful, or at least
legally effective, then the problem is reduced to determining
what remedies should be given to the former property owners.
If, however, the expropriations were legally ineffective, the
Cuba may be said to have unjustly enriched itself at the
expense of the owners and may be holding the properties in a
constructive trust for the benefit of the owners, with the
obligation to eventually return them. 0
From a political standpoint, the resolution of the claims
depends upon a number of domestic and international factors.
One important factor that will shape the process is Cuba's
ability to compensate the claimants, either immediately or in
the long run.3 '
4.2. Right to Private Property Ownership Under Cuban
Constitutional Law
Beginning with Cuba's independence from Spain in 1902,
the country has constitutionally recognized private property,
but the extent of this recognition has varied. The 1901
Constitution, the first constitution of the newly-independent
nation, provided strong protection for private property
38 See B. A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 96
(1977). This distinction has a practical significance because if the Cuba is
holding the properties in a constructive trust, it is bound to return them or
provide equivalent monetary compensation to the owners. If, however, the
property takings were lawful or legally effective, the Cuban government is
free to craft a remedy of its choosing for the takings.
", Some authors believe that Cuba may not be able to afford any program
to provide remedies for property expropriations. See Castafieda &
Montalvdn, supra note 1, at 25 ("[T]he magnitude of the disaster in Cuba
and the requirements to set the country back on track socially, politically
and economically leads one to conclude that attempting to set up a process
of claims adjudication in Cuba, at least during what will no doubt be an
extremely difficult transition period, would be pure folly.").
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rights.32 Similarly, the 1940 Constitution, which was in
effect at the time of the Revolution, gave broad recognition to
private property rights.3"
Throughout the period during which the Revolutionary
government was expropriating the assets of Cubans and
foreign nationals, it retained this broad constitutional
declaration of private property rights intact. The
constitutional provision protecting private property rights was
not deleted until the 1976 Constitution,34 which was enacted
after all the expropriations had been completed.35 Even then,
ownership of private property was not abolished, but only
curtailed.3 6 The 1976 Constitution recognized the right of
small farmers to own land and other means of agricultural
production in Article 20, and the right of farmers to band
together in cooperatives to own land in Article 21.37 In
addition, Article 22 reaffirmed the right of individuals to own
personal property."8
32 See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1901) [Constitution] art.
32 (Cuba), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPILATION OF THE
POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF THE NEW
WORLD 112, 119 (Jos6 Ignacio Rodriguez trans., 1905) [hereinafter
CONSTITuCI6N DE 1901]. Article 32 provided that:
[n]o one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent
authority, upon proof that the condemnation is required by public
utility, and previous indemnification. If the indemnification is not
previously paid, the courts shall protect the owners and, if needed,
restore to them the property.
Id.
83 See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1940) [Constitution]
arts. 85-96 (Cuba), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 610, 626-27
(Amos J. Peaslee ed. & trans., 2d ed.) [hereinafter CONSTITUCI6N DE 1940].
For example, Article 87 provided that "[t]he Cuban Nation recognizes the
existence and legitimacy of private property in its broadest concept as a
social function and without other limitations than those which, for reasons
of public necessity or social interest, are established by law." Id. art. 87, at
626.
34 See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1976) [Constitution]
(Cuba), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1976) [hereinafter
CONSTITUCI6N DE 1976].
" The final expropriations took place in March, 1968. GORDON, supra
note 5, at 107.
36 CONSTITUCI6N DE 1976 arts. 20-22, supra note 34, at 7.
37 See id., art. 21, at 7.
8 Article 22 of the 1976 Constitution provided that:
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A recognition of private property rights remains embedded
in Cuba's legal framework. Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
current constitution, adopted in August 1992, are essentially
equivalent to Articles 20, 21, and 22 of the 1976
Constitution.39  In addition, Article 23 of the 1992
Constitution recognizes the right of private property ownership
through joint ventures and other economic enterprises.40
This uninterrupted constitutional recognition of private
property rights indicates that the Cuban government may not
deprive individuals of their property except as provided by law.
Individual property rights, therefore, can be limited in
accordance with the constitution and the laws, but cannot be
arbitrarily violated by the State.
4.3. Limitations on the Cuba's Ability to Interfere With Private
Property Rights
A State can interfere with an individual's right to own
private property in a number of ways. The two most common
forms of interference are confiscation and expropriation of
assets from their private owners. Confiscation is the seizure
of private property by a State without compensation, usually
to punish the owners for who they are or for what they have
done. Confiscations are ordered for political, religious, legal or
The state guarantees the right of citizens to ownership of personal
property in the way of earnings and savings derived from their own
work, to their place of residence provided that they have legal title to
it, and to their other possessions and objects which serve to satisfy their
material and cultural needs.
Likewise, the state guarantees the right of citizens to
ownership over their personal or family work tools, as long as these
tools are not employed in exploiting the work of others.
Id.
'9 Compare CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1992)
[Constitution] arts. 19-21 (Cuba), published in Gaceta Oficial, at 33, 36
(Aug. 1, 1992) [hereinafter CONSTITUCI6N DE 1992] with CONSTITUCI6N DE
1976 arts. 20-22, supra note 34, at 7.
"o Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution provides that:
The State recognizes the right to property by mixed enterprises,
corporations and economic associations established in accordance
with the law. The use, enjoyment and disposition of the assets
which are the property of the above mentioned enterprises shall be
governed by provisions of the laws and treaties, as well as by the
enterprises' own articles of incorporation and bylaws.
CONSTITUCI6N DE 1992 art. 23, supra note 39, at 36 (translation by author).
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other reasons relating to the owner, and not to the property
itself.4 1 Expropriation, on the other hand, is the taking by a
State of specified property under the color of some public
purpose, with the taking being independent of the acts or
identity of the owner. 2
4.3.1. Confiscation
As a general proposition, confiscation of private property
had always been prohibited by Cuban constitutions."3 This
policy was revised during the first days of the Revolution,"
and soon thereafter the Revolutionary government
promulgated the Fundamental Law to replace the 1940
Constitution." The Fundamental Law ratified and enlarged
the exception to the prohibition against confiscation.' The
41 For example, forfeiture is the confiscation of specific property or
deprivation of rights as punishment for nonperformance of an obligation or
commission of a crime. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (rev. 6th ed. 1990).
42 The state may, for instance, reclaim private land for public use by
eminent domain and thereby expropriate the land from its owners. See id.
at 523.
"' Article 33 of the 1901 Constitution provided that "[iun no case shall the
penalty of confiscation of property be imposed." CONSTITUCI6N DE 1901 art.
33, supra note 32, at 119. Similarly, Article 24 of the 1940 Constitution
provided that "[c]onfiscation of property is prohibited." CONSTITUCI6N DE
1940 art. 24, supra note 33, at 614.
44 Article 24 of the 1940 Constitution was modified as follows:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. However, confiscation is
authorized in the case of property of natural persons or corporate
bodies liable for offenses against the national economy or the public
treasury committed during the tyranny which ended on December
31, 1958, as well as in the case of the property of the tyrant and his
collaborators.
Reforma Constitucional art. 2, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 1 (Jan. 14,
1959) [hereinafter Reforma Constitucional] (emphasis added) (translation
by author).
" See Ley Fundamental, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 1 (Feb. 7, 1959)
[hereinafter Ley Fundamental].
46 Article 24 of the Fundamental Law provided that "[c]onfiscation of
property is prohibited, but it is authorized in the case of property of natural
persons or corporate bodies liable for offenses against the national economy
or the public treasury, or who are enriching themselves, or who have
enriched themselves, unlawfully under the protection of the public
authorities." Id. at 3-4 (translation by author). This provision was further
modified by several amendments to the Fundamental Law, the last of which
amended Article 24 as follows:
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1976 Constitution also included a qualified prohibition against
the confiscation of private property by the State.47 Thus,
although Cuba's Revolutionary government has created
exceptions to the prohibition of the confiscation of private
property, it explicitly recognizes that the State does not have
an unfettered right to seize private property without providing
compensation to its owner.48
4.3.2. Expropriation
Cuban constitutions have always recognized the State's
right to take possession of private property, provided that the
taking is for a legitimate public purpose and that
compensation is paid to the owner. From the country's
Confiscation of property is prohibited, but it is authorized in the
case of the property of the tyrant overthrown on Decenimber 31, 1958
and his accomplices, that of natural persons or corporate bodies
responsible for the crimes against the national economy or the
public treasury, that of those who are enriching themselves or have
done so in the past unlawfully under the protection of the public
authorities, and that of those people who are convicted of crimes
classified as counterrevolutionary, or who leave in any manner the
country's territory in order to evade the reach of the Revolutionary
Tribunals, or those who having abandoned the country commit acts
of conspiracy abroad against the Revolutionary Government.
Ley de Reforma Constitucional, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 1 (July 5,
1960) [hereinafter Ley de Reforma Constitucional] (translation by author).
"' Article 59 of the 1976 Constitution provided that the "[clonfiscation of
property is only applied as a punishment by the authorities in [such] cases
and [under such procedures as] determined by law." CONSTITUCI6N DE 1976
art. 59, supra note 34, at 15. Article 60 of the 1992 Constitution contains
identical language. See CONSTITUCI6N DE 1992 art. 60, supra note 39, at 40.
48 As discussed above, the Fundamental Law and its amendments
significantly expanded the class of people from whom property could be
confiscated. It is important to note, however, that when Cuba proceeded
with its socialist program, it did not take over private properties through an
expansive application of the "confiscation" clause in Article 24, but instead
enacted a series of laws specifically intended to allow the expropriation, and
not the confiscation, of various classes of property. See GORDON, supra note
5, at 118. Recent measures taken by the Cuban government against alleged
money hoarders illustrate the manner in which confiscation is used in Cuba
today. See Ley 149, published in Gaceta Oficial, (May 5, 1994) (establishing
a procedure under which government prosecutors investigate alleged
instances of illicit enrichment and attach properties suspected to be the
result of illegal activities). Although the procedure set up by Ley 149 is
appalling because of its lack of due process, it implicitly recognizes that
property rights exist and that assets cannot be confiscated by the state
without basis and some regard for the owner's rights.
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inception, Article 32 of the 1901 Constitution made this
limited right available to the State.4" Similarly, Article 24 of
the 1940 Constitution gave the State the right to expropriate
private property.50
When the Revolutionary government issued a Fundamental
Law in 1959 to replace the 1940 Constitution, it retained the
text of Article 24 referring to the State's limited expropriation
rights.5 The State's limited right to expropriate private
4" Article 32 of the 1901 Constitution provided that:
No one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent
authority, upon proof that the condemnation is required by public
utility, and previous indemnification. If the indemnification is not
previously paid, the courts shall protect the owners and, if needed,
restore to them the property.
CONSTITUCI6N DE 1901 art. 32, supra note 32, at 119.
o Article 24 of the 1940 Constitution provided that:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. No one can be deprived
of his property [except] by competent judicial authority and for a
justified cause of public utility or social [interest], and always after
the [payment of cash indemnification, as set by the courts].
[Failure to] compl[y] with these requi[rements] will give rise to the
right of the expropriated party to the protection of the courts] and,
if the case calls for it, to have his property restored to him.
The reality of the cause of public utility or social interest, and the
need for expropriation, shall be decided by the courts in case of
impugnation.
CONSTITucI6N DE 1940 art. 24, supra note 33, at 614.
The 1940 Constitution modified the corresponding provision of Article
32 of the 1901 Constitution in four major respects: (1) Only a judicial
authority was empowered to authorize an expropriation; (2) property could
be taken both for reasons of public utility and social interest; (3)
compensation for the property had to be in cash, and the amount was to be
set by the courts; and (4) challenges to the legitimacy of the purpose for the
taking could be raised, and would be decided by the courts. Compare id.
with CoNSTITUcI6N DE 1901 art. 32, supra note 32, at 119. Taken together,
these changes suggest that the drafters of the 1940 Constitution wanted to
expand the State's ability to expropriate private property, but wished to
ensure that such takings were subject to judicial review of the legitimacy of
the purpose behind the taking and the promptness, adequacy and liquidity
of the compensation. The drafters, therefore, attempted to incorporate
international law principles requiring compensation for property
expropriations into the 1940 Constitution.
" Subsequent amendments, including the 1960 amendment of Article 24
of the Fundamental Law, relaxed the constitutional requirements for
expropriating private properties. See Ley de Reforma Constitucional art. 1,
supra note 46, at 1 (amending Article 24 of the Fundamental Law).
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property was also reaffirmed in the 1976 Constitution, which
again authorized the State's right to expropriate private
property.
5 2
It is evident that the Fundamental Law of 1959 (as
amended) and the 1976 and 1992 Constitutions have
weakened, if not eliminated, the guarantees that private
property owners would receive prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation in the event of expropriation. These
constitutions nonetheless continued to recognize two
fundamental requirements for a valid expropriation: (1)
private property can only be taken by the State for some
legitimate public purpose, and (2) such a taking must be
accompanied or followed by the payment of compensation.
These principles, therefore, remain part of Cuba's legal
tradition.
[n]o other natural person or corporate entity shall be deprived of his
property except by competent authority, for a justified cause of
public utility or social or national interest. The procedure for the
expropriations and the methods and forms of payment will be
established by law, as well as the competent authority to declare
the cause of public utility or social or national interest and the
necessity for the expropriation.
Id. For a discussion of the new language on confiscation see supra note 41
and accompanying text.
Gutierrez notes that this amendment greatly weakened the protections
against expropriation by removing the requirements that the action be
taken by a competent judicial authority, that advance payment be made in
cash in an amount set by the courts for the expropriation, and that the
owner be able to appeal to the courts the utility or need for the
expropriation. See Gutierrez, supra note 6, at 7-9.
52 Article 25 of the 1976 Constitution provided that:
The expropriation of property for reasons of public benefit or
social interest and with due compensation is authorized.
The law establishes the method for the expropriation and the
bases on which the need for and the usefulness of this action is to
be determined, as well as the form of the compensation, considering
the interests and economic and social needs of the person whose
property has been expropriated.
CONSTITUCI6N DE 1976 art. 25, supra note 34, at 8. Article 25 of the 1992
Constitution contains identical language. See CONSTITUCI6N DE 1992 art.
25, supra note 39, at 36.
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4.4. Legal Validity and Effectiveness of the Means Used by
Cuba for Its Takings of Property of Cuban Nationals
4.4.1. Means Used for the Property Takings
Cuba's takings of its nationals' property was accomplished
by three methods: (1) confiscations of the property of alleged
officials of the Batista government and its sympathizers, and
subsequent confiscations of the property of alleged counter-
revolutionaries;" (2) expropriations pursuant to major
economic reform laws, such as the Agrarian Reform Law of
1959 and the Urban Reform Law of 1960;54 and (3) takings of
the property of individuals leaving the country as "abandoned
property."
5 5
The first category of property takings was carried out in
1959 and 1960. During those years, the government
confiscated the assets of hundreds of individuals charged with:
(1) being government officials during the 1952-1958 period; or
(2) having benefitted from corruption during the Batista
years.56 The seizures occurred summarily, and the subjects
of the confiscations had the burden of proving that they had
not improperly benefitted from their association with the
ousted regime.5 An estimated $200 million worth of property
was confiscated from officials of the Batista government and
their alleged supporters. 58
The second and most significant group of takings occurred
between 1959 and 1961 through a series of laws intended to
create a socialist economic structure in Cuba. The most
important of these laws were: (1) the Agrarian Reform Law of
1959, which expropriated land holdings in excess of 1,000
acres;5 9 (2) Law 890 of October 1960, which expropriated a
wide range of Cuban-owned industries and businesses;" (3)
s See GORDON, supra note 5, at 72-73.
4See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
"Ley 989, supra note 7, at 23,705.
56 See GORDON, supra note 5, at 72-73.
17 See Ley 78, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 2342 (Feb. 19, 1959).
"See GORDON, supra note 5, at 73 n.18.
"Ley de Reforma Agraria, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 2 (June 3,
1959) [hereinafter Ley de Reforma Agraria].
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the Urban Reform Law of October 1960, which ordained the
forced sale to the State of all the rental residential property in
private hands;6' and (4) a directive issued in March 1968
taking over all remaining small, privately-owned
businesses.62
The third class of takings was conducted pursuant to the
"abandoned property" law of December 1961." This law
confiscated all properties of those who left Cuba and did not
return within a certain period of time." Such properties
were deemed "abandoned" by the owners and seized by the
State.6 5
4.4.2. Validity of the Property Takings Clause
The effects of the property takings by Cuba's Revolutionary
government must 'be assessed from two standpoints: (1)
whether the takings were permissible under the laws in effect
at the time the takings occurred, or alternatively, if the laws
were invalid, whether the takings were permissible under pre-
existing laws, and (2) assuming the laws in effect at the time
of the takings were invalid, whether the takings were
nonetheless legally effective in terms of passing title to the State."
61 Ley de Reforma Urbana, published in Gaceta Oficial, at 2 (Oct. 14,
1960) [hereinafter Ley de Reforma Urbana].
62 See Castro Pledges End of Private Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1968, at 1.
63 See Ley 989, supra note 7, at 23,705.
64 Resolution 454 of the Ministry of the Interior, published in Gaceta
Oficial (Oct. 9, 1961). Resolution 454 gave Cubans leaving the country for
the United States twenty-nine days to return to Cuba; those traveling
elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere had sixty days to return, and those
traveling to Europe had ninety days. Id. Failure to return to Cuba within
those time periods was deemed a permanent departure from the country,
rendering the person's property subject to confiscation. Id.
,5 See Ley 989, supra note 7, at 23,705. In reality, those people wishing
to leave Cuba after 1961 were required to turn their assets over to the state
before being granted final authorization to depart. The author and his
family were subjected to this process in 1963.
"6 In discussing the validity of Cuba's expropriation laws, it is important
to keep in mind the distinction between the legitimacy of the Revolutionary
Government and the legal validity of certain of its acts. Some equate the
two. One commentator argues that legitimacy is created when the state's
power is exercised with both a presumption by the rulers that they have the
right to govern and a corresponding recognition by the governed of that
right; such legitimacy renders the acts of the rulers valid and legally
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4.4.2.1. Validity of the Property Takings Under Existing
Laws
The Revolutionary government cited the changes it made
to the 1940 Constitution, via the Fundamental Law of
February 1959 as ajustification for its property takings during
the 1959-1968 period.6 One such change was a modification
of Article 24 that allowed the confiscation of the property of
officials in the Batista government and others."8 Another
important change to the Constitution was the addition of
Article 232 of the Fundamental Law of February 1959, which
gave the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet), with the approval
of the President, the power to amend the Constitution without
following the amendment procedures set forth in the 1940
Constitution." This provision was the constitutional source
of power for later legislation issued by the Cabinet which
directly amended the Constitution. °
It has been argued that the 1940 Constitution was never
effectively repealed and that the Fundamental Law of 1959
effective. HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 117, 187-88
(1961). Others, however, distinguish between the legitimacy of a
government, which they feel is a question of politics and morality and thus
not amenable to legal adjudication, and the validity or binding nature of its
norms, which can be judicially assessed. Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence
of Successful Treason: Coup d'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
50, 138-40 (1994).
67 For a discussion of these changes, see supra section 4.3.1.
68 See id.
68Article 232 of the Ley Fundamental provides that "[t]his Fundamental
Law may be amended by the Council of Ministers, by affirmative vote of two
thirds of its members, ratified by the same margin in three successive
meetings of the Council of Ministers and subject to the approval of the
President." Ley Fundamental art. 232, supra note 45, at 27. By contrast,
Article 285 of the 1940 Constitution allowed constitutional amendments via
referendum or "super-majority" vote of Congress, and under Article 286,
major constitutional reforms or complete overhaul of the Constitution could
only be accomplished by a Constitutional Convention followed by a
plebiscite. CONSTITUCI6N DE 1940 arts. 285-286, supra note 33, at 668-669.
"' The Council of Ministers exercised this Constitution-giving authority
to incorporate certain important legislation into the Fundamental Law.
Thus, the Agrarian Reform Law includes as its "Final Additional Provision"
a declaration that the Council of Ministers, in exercise of "its Constitution-
making power," made the Agrarian Reform Law an integral part of the
Fundamental Law. See Ley de Reforma Agraria, supra note 59, at 11. The
same declaration is contained in the "Final Provision" of the Urban Reform
Law. See Ley de Reforma Urbana, supra note 61, at 8.
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and subsequent constitutions are invalid because they were
not enacted in accordance with the procedures described in
Articles 285 and 286 of the 1940 Constitution.7 ' As a result,
the argument goes, laws deriving their authority from the
Fundamental Law of 1959 (such as the Agrarian Reform Law)
are invalid."
This argument is based on the assumption that the
Revolutionary government lacked the power to overturn the
existing legal norms, including the Constitution. It is
generally accepted, however, that a successful revolution has
the power under certain conditions to annul the existing
Constitution and create a new set of fundamental legal
norms." These conditions include political control over the
country and the population's acceptance of, or at least
acquiescence to, both the revolutionary regime and its changes
to the constitution and laws.74
7' See Jos6 D. Acosta, El Marco Juridico-Institucional de un Gobierno
Provisional de Unidad Nacional en Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION
FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 61, 78-82 (1992).
72 See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 19, at 899.
Legal authorities and many recent judicial decisions in various
countries have recognized and applied this rule. State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D.
S. Ct. 533, 538-41 (Pakistan); Uganda v. Matovu, 1966 E. Aft. L. R. 514,
535-39 (Uganda); Sallah v. Attorney-General, reprinted in 2 S.O. GYANDOH,
JR. AND J. GRIFFITHS, A SOURCEBOOK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
GHANA 493 (1972) (Ghana); Mitchell v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1985
L.R.C. Const. 127 (Grenada High Ct.) (Grenada); Mokotso v. King
Moshoeshoe II, 1989 L.R.C. Const. 24, 123-33 (Lesotho); Matanzima v.
President of the Republic of Transkei, 4 S. Aft. L.R. 989, 994-97 (1989)
(Transkei).
One commentator notes that in virtually every case in which the legality
of the acts of a de facto government has been challenged, the validity of the
act has been upheld by the courts. See Mahmud, supra note 66, at 53. This
result is independent of whether the challenge is brought while the de facto
regime is in power or thereafter.
"" In Mokotso, the Chief Justice of the Lesotho High Court declared the
test to be as follows:
A court may hold a revolutionary government to be lawful, and its
legislation to have been legitimated ab initio, where it is satisfied
that (a) the government is firmly established, there being no other
government in opposition thereto; and (b) the government's
administration is effective, in that the majority of the people are
behaving, by and large, in conformity therewith.
Mokotso, 1989 L.R.C. Const. at 133. This test is analogous to the traditional
test under international law principles for deciding whether a de facto
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There is little doubt that the requirements cited in the
cases for validating the acts of revolutionary regimes have
been met in Cuba. The Revolutionary government has been in
firm control of the country for over thirty-six years, and
throughout that period there has been general acquiescence by
the population to the legal changes made by it. These include
the enactment of three constitutions and the passage of
legislation that has drastically changed the island's political
and economic structure. To deny legal validity to the
revolutionary laws is, therefore, to deny reality.75
government should be recognized, which includes determining: whether the
new government is in control of the territory and in possession of the
machinery of the state; whether there is public acquiescence in the authority
of the new government; and whether the new government has indicated its
willingness to comply with its obligations under treaties and international
law. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 421-423
(1991).
" It may be open to debate as to when the conditions of effective control
by Cuba's Revolutionary Government and acquiescence by the people to the
social and economic changes brought about by the Revolution were met.
However, it is difficult to dispute that those conditions have been met for
some time. See STANLEY A. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66-67 (3rd ed. 1978) ("Successful revolution sooner or
later begets its own legality .... Thus, might becomes right in the eye of
the law.") It has been pointed out that the Cuban Revolution was
immensely popular at the time it issued the Fundamental Law of February
1959 and, in fact, that law was signed by many eminent Cubans, including
the then President of the Cuban Bar Association. Emilio Cueto, Property
Claims of Cuban Nationals, Address at the Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge Workshop on Resolution of Property Claims in Cuba's
Transition, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 1995) (copy on file with the Journal).
At any rate, a persuasive argument can be made that the conditions for
validating the acts of the Revolutionary government were reached no later
than the end of 1961, by which time the major expropriation laws had been
implemented, with the apparent acquiescence of the Cuban people. (The
legal authorities agree that effective control coupled with popular support
or acquiescence for a period of several years suffices to validate the
revolutionary changes.) Once such validation takes place, it extends back
in time to render valid all acts taken by the revolutionary government since
its accession to power. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186 (1877).
The fact that the acquiescence may have been the result of dictatorial
rule does not negate its legal effect. The Chief Justice of the High Court of
Lesotho explains:
[T]he people may well accept without necessarily approving .... If
they decide to accept the new regime, even if that decision is based
on weakness or even fear, such decision may not be gainsaid ....
Ultimately it is the will of the people, however motivated, which
creates a new legal order and the Court must recognize this fact
and give effect thereto.
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Thus, under this analysis, expropriation laws founded on,
and consistent with, the Fundamental Law of 1959 are valid.
For example, the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 would be valid
under Article 24 of the Fundamental Law because the
properties were taken for an identified public purpose (i.e., to
eliminate large landholdings, which were said to be an
obstacle to the development of the national economy);76 the
State's obligation to provide compensation to the owners of the
expropriated lands was expressly acknowledged; 7  and
mechanisms for providing such compensation were
established." Similar features were contained in the Urban
Reform Law of 1960 and some of the other expropriation
laws. 9
Mokotso, 1989 L.R.C. Const. at 132.
76 Ley de Reforma Agraria, supra note 59, at 2.
7 Art. 29 of the Agrarian Reform Law provided that:
[tihe constitutional right of the owners affected by this Law to
receive indemnification for the expropriation of their property is
acknowledged. Such indemnification shall be set based on the sale
price of the subject farms entered into the municipal land records
before October 10, 1958. The affected installations and buildings
on the farms will be valued separately by the authorities charged
with implementation of this Law. Also valued separately will be
the crops on the subject farms, so that the legitimate owners can be
compensated.
Ley de Reforma Agraria, supra note 59, at 6.
"' Id. Article 31 provides:
The indemnification [for property expropriations] will be paid in
negotiable bonds. To that end, a series of bonds of the Republic of
Cuba will be issued in the amounts, terms and conditions that will
be set at the appropriate time. The bonds shall be denominated
"Agrarian Reform Bonds" and will be regarded as government
obligations. The issuance or issuances will have a term of twenty
years, with an annual interest rate not to exceed four and one-half
percent (4 %). The Republic's Budget for each year shall include
the necessary amount to finance the payment of interest,
amortization and expenses of the issuance.
Id. at 6. The "Final Additional Provision" of the Agrarian Reform Law also
declared that the Council of Ministers, in exercise of its Constitution-giving
powers, declared the Law to be an integral part of the Fundamental Law
and thus amended Article 24 to the extent that it was inconsistent with the
Agrarian Reform Law. Id. at 11.
", Article 37 of the Urban Reform Law also creates a compensation
program for owners of expropriated buildings. Ley de Reforma Urbana,
supra note 61, at 6-7. Law 890 of October 13, 1960 established, with respect
to the expropriation of Cuban-owned industries and businesses, that "[t]he
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At least one type of property seizure, one made upon the
departure of its owners from Cuba under an abandonment
theory, appears to be inconsistent with the constitutional
norms in place at the time of the takings and therefore invalid,
however8 0
There are three reasons for the conclusion that these
seizures are invalid. First, the properties were not taken for
an express public purpose but only because they were deemed
"abandoned." Second, the properties were confiscated outright
and no effort was made to establish a mechanism to
compensate the former owners. Third, to the extent that the
confiscations involved "personal consumption" items (e.g.,
residences, motor vehicles, works of art, jewelry), the
confiscations were inconsistent with the principles of socialism
that had been embraced by the Revolution long before the
takings took place."1 Socialist property principles distinguish
between means of production, which are the property of the
State, and items of personal consumption, over which the State
has only limited rights.8 2  The confiscation of personal
consumption items was therefore inconsistent with socialist
doctrine."3 Thus, under socialist principles of property rights,
means and forms of payment of the indemnification that will be due to
natural or juridical persons whose properties are expropriated under this
Law, will be established in subsequent legislation." Ley 890, supra note 60,
at 2. Such additional legislation, however, was never actually enacted.
" Of course, any seizures made without authority of law (such as the
March 1968 takings of small businesses) would be by definition invalid.
81 See DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND SOCIETY
IN CONTEMPORARY CUBA 11-14 (1994) (summarizing the transformation of
Cuba to a socialist legal order in the first few years of the Revolution).
82 See CONSTITUcI6N DE 1992 arts. 15 & 24, supra note 39, at 35-36
(distinguishing between the State's ownership of the means of production
and the right to private ownership of personal property).
83 One commentator posits an additional reason why the confiscations of
the property of the Cubans leaving the country may be invalid: Law 989
appears to have been enacted to punish those who left the country for
political reasons, and if so it would be unconstitutional in that it
discriminated against a class of people because of their political beliefs,
contrary to Article 33 of the Constitution of 1940 and the Fundamental Law
of February 1959. Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 19, at 903-04.
The legal theory on which Law 989 was based, that the individuals who
left Cuba for political reasons "abandoned" their property, is invalid for a
number of reasons. For example, the doctrine of abandonment of property
requires a voluntary relinquishment of the property. Id. at 904-06. The
Cubans who fled the country in the early 1960s for fear of political
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Law 969 of December 5, 1961, appears to be invalid as it is in
violation of the Fundamental Law of 1959.
Another argument occasionally raised against the
Revolution's constitutional changes and property expropriation
laws is that none of the laws enacted by the Revolutionary
government are valid due to the illegitimate nature of the
government. 4 This argument fails because the laws of a
revolutionary regime that is fully in control and receives
popular support are valid, regardless of the legitimacy of the
regime. Also, as a practical matter, a blanket challenge to the
Revolution's legislation is troubling, in that it implies that all
laws issued by the Batista regime after the 1952 coup d'6tat
were invalid, as well as all laws issued by several other de
facto regimes that have ruled Cuba.85 A future government
would likely be de facto in nature, moreover, and thus its laws
(including those dealing with property issues) would be subject
to the same attack as the Revolutionary government's
expropriations. In short, a successful challenge to the validity
of all post-1959 laws on the grounds of lack of constitutional
legitimacy by the enacting government could leave Cuba in a
persecution were not acting voluntarily when they left their property
behind. In many cases, they were required to turn over their assets to the
state in order to be permitted to depart. Under the circumstances, the
forsaking of their personal assets was the result of coercion and cannot be
deemed to constitute an act of abandonment. Id. at 906.
The current state of title to "abandoned" property seized pursuant to
Law 989 has been examined under the provisions governing adverse
possession (usucapio) in Cuba's Civil Code of 1889 and its successor, the
1987 Civil Code (Law 59 of July 17, 1987). See id. at 912-23; Cueto, supra
note 75, at 16-23. This Article will not consider the adverse possession
theory, other than to note that most current possessors of "abandoned"
property would appear to have good title to it, either under the adverse
possession principles embodied in the 1889 Civil Code (if still applicable) or
those in the 1987 Civil Code (if the new Code is indeed in effect). See
Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 19, at 912-23.
"' See N6stor Cruz, Legal Issues Raised by the Transition: Cuba From
Marxism to Democracy, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF
TH CUBAN ECONOMY 51 (1992).
"' Shortly after seizing power through a coup d'6tat in 1952, the Batista
government issued a Constitution that, among other things, gave the
Council of Ministers the right to amend the Constitution in derogation of the
express provisions of Articles 285 and 286 of the 1940 Constitution, the
same procedure followed in the Fundamental Law of 1959. See Cueto, supra
note 75, at 13.
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State of legal chaos and make it difficult for the country to
govern itself.8"
4.4.2.2. Validity of the Property Takings Under Pre-
Revolution Laws
It has been argued, based on the assumption that the
Fundamental Law of February 1959 and other constitutions
enacted by the Revolutionary government were invalid and the
1940 Constitution is still in effect, that the property
expropriations conducted during the 1959-1968 period were
invalid because the government failed to comply with Article
24 of the 1940 Constitution, which required the advance
payment of cash compensation to the owners of the
expropriated property. 7
It appears unlikely, however, even if it is held that the
1940 Constitution was in effect during the Revolution, that the
Cuban courts would find laws like the Agrarian Reform Law
and the Urban Reform Law to be invalid.8" Although those
laws resulted in the expropriation of many assets from the
private sector, the laws established compensation mechanisms
which, if implemented, would have provided payment to the
owners over time.8" A court could find that such
compensation schemes were insufficient or inadequately
implemented, but were not in violation of the intent of Article
24.
4.4.3. Effectiveness of the Expropriations
The last remaining question is whether, assuming the 1940
Constitution was still in effect and the expropriations were
deemed unlawful because compensation was not paid in
advance, the takings nonetheless vested title to the properties
with the government. The language of Article 24 of the 1940
88 See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 19, at 899.
87 Gregorio Escagedo, Jr., Posibles Problemas que Confrontaremos en
Cuba: Sus Soluciones, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE
CUBAN ECONOMY 250, 253 (1993).
88 Of course, the political branches of a transition government could
decide to enact laws reversing the expropriations or providing other
remedies to the former owners.
88 See, e.g., Ley de Reforma Agraria, supra note 59, at 6.
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Constitution strongly suggests that the Cuban government's
failure to pay compensation in accordance with the
constitutional provision did not render the takings legally
ineffective, but instead transferred title of the properties to the
government and gave rise to an obligation to compensate
former owners.90
After setting forth the legal requirements for a
governmental expropriation of private property, Article 24
provided that "[flailure to comply with [its] requirements shall
give rise to the right by the person whose property has been
expropriated to the protection of the courts and, if appropriate,
to have the property returned to him.""' Under this Article,
it is clear that transfer of property back to its original owners
was neither automatic nor constitutionally required. Indeed,
under the procedure established by Article 24, the owner of an
expropriated property who wished to contest the validity of the
taking had to sue the government and, if successful, could
obtain relief from the court in the form of damages or return
of the property. Thus, unless and until a court ruled that the
property should be returned, title to the property remained
with the State.2
4.4.4. Conclusions on the Validity and Effectiveness of the
Property Takings
The above discussion strongly suggests that a reviewing
court would hold that most of the Revolutionary government's
takings of private property from Cuban nationals were legally
valid. In the alternative, if such a court ruled that the takings
"See CONSTITUCI6N DE 1940 art. 24, supra note 33, at 614.
"1 ld. (emphasis added).
" The conclusion that the State acquired and retains title to the
properties it seized is also consistent with a literal reading of Article 194 of
the 1940 Constitution, which provides that when a law was invalidated by
a Cuban court on the grounds of unconstitutionality, such invalidation has
only prospective effect and does not alter the effectiveness of prior
applications of the law. See CONSTITucI6N DE 1940 art. 194, supra note 33,
at 649 ("In every case the legislative or regulatory provision or
administrative measure declared unconstitutional shall be considered null
and without any value or effect from the date the decision is made public in
court."). Article 172 of the Fundamental Law of 1959 contains an identical
provision. See Ley Fundamental art. 172, supra note 45, at 19. For a
discussion of the issues raised by Article 194 of the Constitution of 1940, see
Cueto, supra note 75, at 15-16, and authorities cited therein.
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were invalid, it is likely that the court would find that the
takings were nonetheless effective in transferring title of the
properties to the State.
This does not mean, however, that the Cuban government
has no remaining duties to its citizens for the takings. It does
not appear that the former owners were ever compensated for
any of the expropriations, even where, as with the Agrarian
Reform Law, a legal mechanism was created to provide
indemnification. Cuba, therefore, still has a legal obligation to
comply with Article 24 of the Fundamental Law of 1959 (or the
1940 Constitution) and provide remedies (compensation,
restitution, or other) to those whose properties were
expropriated or confiscated without cause." The definition
and implementation of the remedies should be addressed
through new laws issued by the government.94 Section five
below identifies some of the decisions that will need to be
made during the process of providing those remedies.
5. SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF REMEDIES FOR CUBA'S PROPERTY EXPROPRIATIONS
A system providing remedies for the property
expropriations carried out by a socialist regime must attempt
to achieve several somewhat inconsistent objectives. Those
objectives include: 1) providing predictable and substantially
fair treatment to all interested parties; 2) creating, in the
shortest possible time, a regime of clear, secure and
marketable rights to property; 3) promoting the expeditious
privatization of state-held assets; 4) encouraging the early
onset of substantial foreign investment; and 5) keeping the
" The validity of the confiscations of property owned by individuals
accused of graft during the Batista regime presents a special case that will
likely be resolved separately.
4 Such legislation, for example, could vest title of the properties in an
appropriate government agency and establish a mechanism for providing
remedies to the former owners. The legislation also could expressly declare
that the state has good title to the expropriated properties and that the
courts have no jurisdiction to consider challenges to the disposition of the
properties. Such provisions would preclude disputes over title holding up
the productive utilization of the properties. See Matias P. Travieso-Diaz &
Steven R. Escobar, Overview of Required Changes in Cuba's Laws and Legal
Institutions During its Transition to a Free-Market Democracy, Address at
the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban
Economy 46-49 (Aug. 1994) (on file with the Journal).
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aggregate cost of the remedies within the financial means of
the country.9 5 As a government tries to implement these
objectives, it must resolve a number of substantive and
procedural questions. The discussion that follows considers
some of these questions and explores how other countries have
addressed these same issues. These countries' experiences
may provide useful guidance in the development of a system
of remedies for Cuba's expropriations.
5.1. Treatment of Different Types of Property
A key issue is whether different types of property
(industrial, coinmercial, agricultural, residential, and personal)
should receive different treatment. Some types of expropriated
property, such as large industrial installations, may lend
themselves readily to direct restitution because the identity of
the former owners may be uncontested and the extent of the
ownership rights may be relatively easy to establish. At the
other end of the spectrum, residential property is likely to be
subject to contentious disputes among a variety of claimants,
including former owners and their successors, current
occupants, and others."6 Nontangible property rights, such
as rights to payment of money, typically are not included in
property claim resolution legislation, nor are claims based on
"See Jon L. Mills, Principal Issues in Confiscated Real Property in Post-
Communist Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE
CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES 23, app. A (JoAnn Klein ed.,
1994) for a similar list of objectives.
6 In the former Czechoslovakia, restitution of residential property led
to numerous disputes between original owners and current occupants, as
well as between competing claimants, which resulted in clogged courts. See
Gray et al., supra note 17, at 49; Gelpern, supra note 2, at 360. In addition,
"the legal precedence given restitution over privatization has created great
uncertainty among potential investors and has complicated privatization,
particularly in the case of small businesses and housing." Gray et al., supra
note 17, at 49.
A complicating factor in the case of Cuba is the fact that Cuba is
entering into a number of joint ventures with foreign (non-U.S.) investors.
See e.g., An Index of Foreign Investment in Cuba, LA SOCIEDAD ECONOMICA,
Bull. 43 (Sept. 1994). Many of these ventures involve property that was
expropriated from U.S. and Cuban nationals. See id. A transition
government will have to balance the rights and interests of former owners
against those of third parties who have invested in Cuba.
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loss of earning capacity, deprivation of human rights, loss of
life, or other injuries to the individual.9 7
Some countries, including the former Czechoslovakia, have
opted to enact different laws for the various types of property
for which claims were brought. The former Czechoslovakia
enacted a series of restitution laws which distinguished
between "small" property (e.g., small businesses and
apartment buildings), "large" property (e.g., industries and
associated real estate), and agricultural lands and forests, with
each type of property subject to somewhat different procedures
and remedies.9" The restitution of "small" property was
governed by the Small Federal Restitution Law, which
provided for direct restitution to its original owners.99 The
" Some countries, including the former Czechoslovakia, have granted
remedies for non-property infringements such as political persecutions, but
the relief given has been largely declaratory (e.g., invalidating job
terminations due to political reasons) and no actual remedies, such as job
reinstatements, damages, or special pensions, have been given to the
victims. See Gelpern, supra note 2, at 337 n.73. On the other hand,
Hungary has provided compensation in the form of interest-bearing
securities (vouchers), life annuities, or social security benefits "to persons
deprived of their freedom or life for political reasons" between 1939 and
1989. Katherine Simonetti et al., Compensation and Resolution of Property
Claims in Hungary, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE
CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES 61, 74 (JoAnn Klein ed., 1994).
It has been argued that providing remedies to Cuban property claimants
without, at the same time, compensating the victims of non-property rights
abuses
may be unacceptable-even offensive-to [the latter], or, for that
matter, to anyone (including the international community)
expecting that the New Cuban Authorities will be sensitive to
human rights abuses and that they should also send a clear signal
to the world about their commitment to 'first-amendment-type'
rights.
Cueto, supra note 75, at 24. The subject of remedies for non-property rights
claims is beyond the scope of this Article. The author notes, however, that
at least some of those who argue in favor of giving remedies to non-property
rights claimants recognize that providing such remedies would be
impractical. Id. at 24-25; Castafieda & Montalv~n, supra note 1, at 30.
98 After the division of Czechoslovakia into separate Czech and Slovak
states, the Czech Republic enacted a fourth law returning land confiscated
from ethnic Germans and Hungarians after the end of World War II.
Gelpern, supra note 2, at 327.
" Gray et al., supra note 17, at 49. Both natural persons and companies
could claim restitution under this law. See Gelpern, supra note 2, at 340.
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Large Federal Restitution Law provided for the return of
"large" property to its former owners." ° In situations where
the property was in use by natural persons or foreign entities,
however, the return of the property was barred, and the
government paid compensation instead.10' For agricultural
land and forests, the Federal Land Law provided for the
presumptive return of lands to the original owners."
Where "neither the land originally [expropriated], nor a
substantially similar parcel in the locality [was] available,"
financial compensation was provided as an alternative reme-
dy.l
03
Cuba may want to follow Czechoslovakia's example and
enact separate laws for the various types of property subject
to claims. This would be prudent in light of the unique
considerations associated with each type (f property, and the
potentially distinct legal rights involved depending upon the
means originally used by Cuba (confiscation, expropriation,
seizure of "abandoned" property) to justify the takings.
5.2. Parties Entitled to a Remedy for Property Expropriations
The universe of potential claimants under Cuba's remedies
program may include registered U.S. claimants who are
permitted to opt-out of a U.S.-Cuba settlement (assuming such
an option is available), non-registered U.S. claimants, Cuban
nationals who acquired U.S. citizenship after their properties
were confiscated, other Cuban nationals living abroad, and
Cubans living on the island. O4 In deciding who will be
100 See Gelpern, supra note 2, at 337.
101 I&. at 338. Cash compensation under this law has been quite limited,
with a cap of approximately $1,000; most of the compensation has been in
the form of state securities which can be invested in newly-privatized
companies or shares in the companies themselves. See Gray et al., supra
note 17, at 49; Gelpern, supra note 2, at 338.
10 See Gelpern, supra note 2, at 337. Originally, restitution was limited
to parcels under 150 hectares for non-agricultural land and 250 hectares for
farmland. Id. at 339. These restrictions were subsequently lifted. Id.
103 Id
1*4 As discussed supra note 22, some Cuban-Americans may want to be
treated as U.S. claimants and have their claims included in a future U.S.-
Cuba settlement. It is likely, in any case, that naturalized U.S. citizens of
Cuban origin will be treated by Cuba as Cuban nationals for purposes of the
claims settlement process and will, therefore, be covered by whatever
provisions Cuba makes for handling the claims of Cuban citizens living
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entitled to a remedy, the Cuban government will need to
address the issues of whether Cuban citizens residing abroad
and those who have become citizens of another country will
qualify for remedies, and which successors in interest, if any,
of the original property owners will be entitled to a remedy.
On the question of the treatment of expatriates, the
approaches followed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia in
dealing with 6migr~s are instructive. In Hungary, foreign
citizens and residents may claim compensation if they were
Hungarian citizens at the time of expropriation.'
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, conditions 6migr6s' claims
on the type of property expropriated. Emigr6s are eligible to
claim restitution for "small" property, but not for 'large"
property.' In addition, in Czechoslovakia, only resident
citizens are entitled to restitution of agricultural and forestry
lands." The Hungarian system provides perhaps the most
equitable and pragmatic model for the treatment of claims
from Cuban expatriates. Adoption of such an open system by
Cuba would eliminate a potential source of civil discord, which
could be particularly significant due to the large number of
Cubans living abroad who have outstanding expropriation
claims.
The examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia also serve to
illustrate the different approaches that may be taken
regarding successors in interest. Czechoslovakia is in this
regard the more liberal of the two countries because all of its
restitution laws allow former owners, as well as their co-
owners and partners, to recover remedies for
expropriations." 8  In addition, all "testamentary heirs or
immediate family [members] may claim in proportion to their
share of the [owner's] inheritance.""' In Hungary, by
contrast, when the former owner is deceased, the descendants
abroad.
10" Gelpern, supra note 2, at 347. "Foreign and national claims are
treated equally under Hungarian law." Id.
106 Id at 340.
1 See id. Moreover, Czechoslovakia's Federal Land Law prohibits
foreign ownership of land in Czechoslovakia, thereby precluding 6migr~s
who have become citizens of other countries from owning land in
Czechoslovakia. Id. at 341 n.95.
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may claim compensation only for their proportional share of
the estate. If any of the descendants are dead, the surviving
descendants do not share in the deceased descendant's
share."' The surviving spouse of a deceased claimant is
only entitled to compensation if there are no surviving
descendants and if the surviving spouse was married to and
living with the decedent both at the time of the expropriation
and at the time of the claimant's death."'
A considerable amount of time has passed since Cuba's
expropriations and it is likely that many of the former
property owners will have died by the time a claims settlement
process is implemented. Under these circumstances, the
Cuban government will have to decide whether the heirs of
former owners are entitled to share in the remedies, and if so,
who qualifies as an heir for purposes of determining eligibility
for remedies.
5.3. Administration of Remedies
Some countries have established agencies whose sole
purpose is to administer remedies. Hungary, for example, has
established compensation offices in each county and in
Budapest, and an appellate National Compensation Office in
the capital. Decisions of the local offices may be appealed to
* See id. at 347.
... Id. Other countries seeking to define the eligible claimants for
expropriation remedies have adopted a variety of definitions. For example,
Estonia allows claims for individuals who are presently Estonian citizens or
who were citizens at the time of the country's annexation by the USSR, as
well as the owner's testamentary heirs or, if the owner died intestate, the
spouse, parents, and children of the owner. Frances H. Foster, Post-Soviet
Approaches to Restitution: Lessons for Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION:
OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED-PROPERTIES 93,
96-97 (JoAnn Klein ed., 1994). Latvia allows claims by "previous owners or
their heirs, regardless of their present citizenship." Id. at 97 (quoting
Republic of Latvia Law on the Return of Buildings to their Legal Owners
(Oct. 30, 1991)). Lithuania restricts restitution to current citizens and
permanent residents of the country, and only extends the right to bring a
claim to former owners, and, if they are deceased, to their surviving parents,
spouses, children and grandchildren. I& at 98.
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the National Office," 2 whose decisions are reviewable by a
designated civil court in Budapest."'
Other countries, such as Germany, have assigned
responsibility for handling expropriation claims to the local
property registry where the property at issue is located."4
Czechoslovakia has chosen not to establish an agency to
administer or review restitution claims, but rather it has left
the matter to negotiation between the former owner and the
person occupying the property."5 If agreement cannot be
reached through negotiation, the matter is adjudicated in
court."
l 6
Given the large number and contentious nature of the
claims that will likely be asserted in Cuba, it will be necessary
to establish an independent agency within the Cuban
government with jurisdiction over determining the validity of
claims of title to confiscated property and over the dispensing
of remedies. Adequate staff and personnel training will need
to be provided in advance, inventories of the subject properties
will need to be made, and valuation methods will need to be
developed.
5.4. Procedures for Dispensing the Remedies
The procedures for resolving property claims will need to
set stringent, but reasonable time, limits for filing remedy
requests;"7 define the means and procedures for proving
112 The National Compensation Office has a staff of 500. Gelpern, supra
note 2, at 348.
.13 Simonetti et al., supra note 96, at 67.
114 See Dorothy A. Jeffress, Note, Resolving Rival Claims on East
German Property Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527, 543-44
(1991) (discussing the rationale behind, and the advantage of, maintaining
preexisting property registries as the authorities to hear claims).
,, Gelpern, supra note 2, at 342.
'16 Id- The Federal Land Law requires the involvement of the local Land
Office in the resolution of restitution claims against land. Id. at 342-43.
The Land Office can veto, compel, or amend an agreement to return land to
its former owner on a variety of public interest grounds. Id- at 343.
"7 Hungary set a ninety-day deadline for filing claims under the first of
its compensation laws, enacted in April 1991. Simonetti et al., supra note
94, at 66. That deadline, however, was extended several times through
1994. Id. Initially, Germany set a deadline of October 1990 for filing
property restitution claims. That deadline was later extended to the end of
1992 for real property and the middle of 1993 for personal property. Paul
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title; establish mechanisms for adjudicating title disputes,
dispensing remedies, and appealing agency determinations;
enforce the duties of those whose property is returned to them
(e.g., payment of taxes, environmental cleanup and economic
use of the property); and put in place the administrative
procedures and bureaucratic apparatus needed to determine
and implement the applicable remedy in each case. The
experiences of other countries demonstrate the importance of




Many claimants would like to have the confiscated property
returned to them. The possibility of returning the actual
property seized by the government, however, depends on
factors such as the type and size of the property, economic and
social considerations (e.g., how the property is currently being
used), and the possibility of clear identification if the original
property has been subject to transformation, merger,
subdivision, improvement, or other changes.
In addition, the rights of current lessors, occupants, or
other users of the property must be taken into account, and
any restrictions or obligations on the claimants' use and
transfer of the property after its return must be specified. The
difficulties arising from these considerations may dictate
alternative remedies, such as compensation or return of
Dodds, Restitution Claims in Eastern Germany: An Experience to Avoid, in
CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF
EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES 125, 131 (JoAnn Klein ed., 1994).
" One commentator describes the consequences of inadequate
administrative procedures for handling expropriation claims in the Baltic
republics as follows:
Baltic administrative and judicial organs have paid a heavy price
for this lack of foresight and concrete action. With only a limited
number of qualified staff, these bodies have been flooded with
literally hundreds of thousands of restitution cases. The result has
been significant delay in confirmation, review, and resolution of
claims and in ultimate distribution ofproperty or compensation....
T]his has proven to be a major stumbling block to overall national
privatization efforts.
Foster, supra note 111, at 106-07 (footnotes omitted).
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substitute property (i.e., the transfer of equivalent property to
the one confiscated). Where return of substitute property is
employed, it is necessary to specify how equivalence of the
properties will be defined and established.
The choices regarding the appropriate remedy for
expropriations made by countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and the consequences of these choices illustrate the
trade-offs inherent in each remedy. Return of the confiscated
property or a substitute property has been the preferred
remedy in Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic Republics,
Bulgaria and Romania." 9 Hungary, however, has chosen to
provide compensation to the former owners, instead of
returning the expropriated assets to them. 20
At the start of its return to democracy, Czechoslovakia,
which implemented an aggressive, across-the-board restitution
program, was under conditions similar to those of Cuba today,
in that the State had total control over most forms of
property.' 2 ' As previously discussed, Czechoslovakia passed
three successive laws which returned to their private owners
"small" properties, "large" properties, and agricultural lands
and forests. 22 In each case, restitution was the presumptive
remedy. 21 If, however, restitution was either undesirable or
impossible, the former owner could receive instead limited
compensation in cash and securities.M
"' Conversely, all of the former Soviet Republics, with the exception of
the Baltic states, have expressly refused to grant restitution of property
expropriated during the Communist Era. Foster, supra note 111, at 93.
120 See Gelpern, supra note 2, at 344.
121 One significant difference between the two countries is the fact that
Czechoslovakia had almost no foreign debt when it made its transition to
democracy. Cuba, however, is both heavily in debt and in the midst of a
severe economic crisis which may continue for many years. It has been
suggested that countries which enjoyed relatively favorable economic
conditions while developing their remedies programs, such as
Czechoslovakia, decidedthey could afford the economic costs associated with
restitution, whereas countries with high inflation and foreign debt, such as
Hungary, rejected restitution for fear of its potential interference with
privatization, foreign investment, and economic recovery. Id. at 371-72.
122 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
12 Gelpern, supra note 2, at 337.
124 Id. at 337-38. Restitution may be undesirable or impossible because
the property had been altered or destroyed, was in the hands of holders
exempt from claims under the laws, or served a public purpose.
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The restitution programs implemented in countries like
Czechoslovakia have been praised for "enhanc[ing] the
credibility of economic reform by increasing its
irreversibility,"'25 providing a way to resolve claims without
impacting the country's depleted treasury, 2 ' and lending
political legitimacy to the government and the democratization
process.' Restitution as a remedy for expropriation,
however, has been severely criticized on economic grounds. 2 '
In addition, its performance in Czechoslovakia and the other
countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been specifically
questioned.129
125 Offe & Banker, supra note 1, at 31.
126 See id. at 31-32.
127 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 33.
128 Offe & Banker describe the negative economic consequences of
restitution and other remedies as follows:
(i) As it does not correspond in any sense to criteria of need, past
or future achievement, or to standards of equal citizenship rights,
restitution causes certain injustices which are further aggravated
by the contingencies within the very process of restitution. (ii)
Restitution nurtures the 'old' economic attitudes of claiming
resources from the state and favors rent-seeking behavior. (iii)
Restitution aggravates the notorious fiscal problems of post-
Communist states. (iv) Since the former owners and their heirs
are not necessarily the most suitable owners and entrepreneurs,
natural restitution may lead to a temporary misallocation of assets.
(v) Natural restitution makes property rights uncertain until all
claims are filed and resolved, thus increasing private investment
risks and delaying the privatization process. (vi) Restitution may
lead to the restoration of highly inefficient smallholdings. (vii)
Restitution via compensation may fuel inflation. (viii) Due to its
distributional effects, restitution may endanger the social consensus
needed for the lasting establishment of a new polity.
Offe and Banker, supra note 1, at 32.
... Gray et al. summarize the restitution experience in Eastern Europe
as follows:
Restitution-in-kind is complex and leaves many problems in its
wake. The legal precedence typically given restitution over
privatization has created great uncertainty among potential
investors andhas complicated privatization, particularly in the case
of small business and housing. It is also leading to many disputes
that are beginning to clog the courts. In Romania, for example,
restitution of agricultural land has led to more than 300,000 court
cases.
Gray et al., supra note 17, at 4. They level similar criticisms against the
programs instituted in Czechoslovakia. Id. at 49.
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A number of analysts have concluded that the use of
restitution in Cuba would be fraught with perils.'
Conversely, other commentators have predicted that
restitution of the expropriated properties to former owners
would have a positive economic impact.' 3'
130 For example, in evaluating the potential implementation of a
restitution program in Cuba against the experiences in the Baltic republics,
one commentator writes:
The Baltic experience reveals, however, that there could be serious
drawbacks to Cuban adoption of a restitution program.
Identification, certification, review, and resolution of restitution
applications could create a significant burden on inexperienced,
inadequately staffed governmental and judicial organs. Cuba, like
the Baltic states, has only limited personnel with the legal and real
estate expertise to handle complex property issues.
Furthermore, the preceding study suggests that restitution could
act as a major brake on overall Cuban national economic
modernization. It could delay the establishment of stable,
marketable legal title to assets, a critical requirement for both
privatization and domestic and foreign investment. Moreover, it
could further drain an already depleted Cuban national treasury.
A Baltic-style restitution program would obligate the Cuban state
either to turn over state and collective property gratuitously or to
pay equivalent compensation. In the Cuban case this would be
particularly onerous because of the sheer enormity of U.S. claims
for "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation for expropriated
property.
Finally, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania indicate that restitution
could have a severe socioeconomic impact on current Cuban
citizens. As in these three states, the Cuban government has
heavily subsidized the living expenses of its population. It has
prevented its citizens from significant acquisition of assets and,
until recently, legally prohibited them from accumulating hard
currency. Thus, if Cuba should elect to return property to former
owners (many of whom are foreign corporations or emigres) and to
introduce free market mechanisms, its present population would be
at a competitive disadvantage. Similar to the Baltic case, Cuba
should expect particularly negative results in the housing sector,
including widespread eviction of tenants.
Foster, supra note 111, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
"' Gutierrez, supra note 6, at 17. Gutierrez writes that:
Full restitution of all non-materially altered industrial, commercial
and agricultural properties to their legitimate owners will not only
carry out the justice required for social peace, but it will also place
the means of production in the hands of those entrepreneurs which
had elevated Cuba to the top of nearly every socio-economic index
in Latin America prior to the communist revolution. By creating
constitutional and other legal incentives to encourage the
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5.5.2. Compensation
In Hungary, as noted earlier, the remedy of choice has been
lump sum compensation by way of interest-bearing
transferable securities or "vouchers" known as Compensation
Coupons, issued by the Compensation Office.3 2 The amount
of loss eligible for compensation is determined using a sliding
scale based on the assessed value of the lost property, with the
first 200,000 forints (HUF) (approximately $2,100)
compensated in full. 33 The next HUF 100,000 (HUF
200,001-300,000) is compensated at 50%; the next HUF
200,000 (HUF 300,001-500,000), at 30%; and any remaining
losses (HUF 500,001 and up), at 10% with an overall cap on
recovery of HUF 5 million (approximately $53,600).134 The
coupons are traded as securities and pay interest at 75% of the
basic rate set by the central bank.3 5 The coupons cannot be
redeemed for cash, but may be used as collateral for loans; as
payment for property sold by the State, including land, shares
in state-owned industries, and apartments; in exchange for
unleashing of the creative energies of the Cuban people (both on the
island and in exile), Cuba can rapidly earn foreign exchange
through exports, produce abundantly for its own domestic
consumption, employ workers at real jobs paying in a currency that
has value (unlike today's Cuban peso), and restore labor rights.
The economic multiplier effect of this combined economic activity
will rapidly return prosperity to the island.
Id.
' Simonetti et al., supra note 96, at 69.
133 Gelpern, supra note 2, at 344. The valuation method used for
calculating compensation in Hungary is as follows:
For non-agricultural real estate, compensation is measured in
proportion to the area, valued at HUF 200 to HUF 2000 per square
meter, depending on the present location. Classifications [of
location] include Budapest, provincial towns, villages and vacant
lots outside any of the enumerated areas. For companies, the value
is proportional to the size of the workforce permanently employed
at the time of confiscation. Where the claim is for loss of farmland,
cadastral net income of arable land, the Gold Crown Value, is the
basis for compensation.
Id. (footnotes omitted). 'The Gold Crown Value is a measure of the land's
productive potential which originated in the 19th Century." Id. at 344
n.112.
13 Gray et al., supra note 17, at 70.
13 Simonetti et al., supra note 96, at 69. Interest on the coupons
accrued from August 1991 through December 1994. See id.
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annuities, if the holder is of retirement age or incapacitated;
as payment in some retail shops; and as investment
instruments."3 6 Only former owners of land, however, may use
their coupons to purchase farmland. Land is auctioned off by
the State, thereby enabling former owners to purchase back
their land, provided they are the highest bidders and their
parcel is actually auctioned. Cooperatives, however, hold the
best land and are expected to retain their landholdings.1"7
The Hungarian system provides an interesting, and
perhaps realistic, model for the resolution of some
expropriation claims in Cuba. The Hungarian system
recognizes a country's limited ability to pay compensation
claims, an important consideration for economically-ravaged
Cuba. It also takes into account the rights of current
occupants or users of the property, thus avoiding the
dislocation costs and disputes associated with direct restitution
systems. On the downside, however, the level of compensation
provided in Hungary is limited by the fact that the vouchers
trade at less than 50% of their face value.' The difficulties
of understanding and using the voucher system wisely, and the
complexity of the entire process have spurred dissatisfaction
with the system.'
The experience with Hungary's compensation scheme also
raises a number of questions including what bases should be
used for valuing the expropriated property and for settling the
compensation scale and what forms of payment other than
vouchers can be used (e.g., annuities, bonds, promissory notes,
stock certificates in privatized enterprises, and combinations
of several forms). 40 The adequacy of the amount offered
'- See id. at 69-72.
17 See id.
13 See id. at 78. The voucher's value as a source of annuity payments
is low. See id.
"3 See id. The use of vouchers may also prove inadequate if the
privatization program falters, as is said to have occurred in the Czech and
Slovak Republics. See Heather V. Weibel, Note, Avenues for Investment in
the Former Czechoslovakia: Privatization and the Historical Development of
the New Commercial Code, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 889, 921 (1993).
14 See Cueto, supra note 75, at 26-28 for a brief discussion of some of the
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relative to the loss and the security and marketability of the
compensation instruments must also be considered.
5.5.3. Other remedies
One commentator has suggested that the best approach to
resolving the claims issue in Cuba would be to establish a
system using a hybrid of partial compensation, partial
restitution, vouchers, rights in joint ventures with the State,
and partial forgiveness. 41 In addition, he has proposed that
ad hoc, case-by-case negotiations be used to resolve the most
significant claims."4 Other remedies that could be used in
Cuba, but have not been attempted elsewhere, include
economic incentives to invest in the country. Some examples
of such remedies are priority in bidding on properties being
privatized, tax benefits, and preferences in government
contracting.
6. CONCLUSION
It is virtually certain, for political as well as legal reasons,
that Cuba will need to provide a remedy to its citizens (both on
the island and abroad) whose property was expropriated or
unjustly confiscated by the Revolutionary government. It is
almost just as probable that neither of the standard
approaches, restitution or compensation, will be satisfactory or
practical if implemented in large measure. The economic
condition of the country will not allow more than token
compensation to the former owners, unless payment is delayed
for a substantial period of time. Restitution will pose a myriad
of legal and political problems, and may cast doubt upon
property titles, causing considerable discouragement of foreign
investment, privatization, and economic recovery.
These circumstances appear to preclude any mechanistic
approach to the issue or the institution of unbending or
simplistic rules. A variety of remedies, each tailored to the
characteristics of discrete categories of claims and claimants,
will need to be developed in order to provide just results
141 A.R.M. Ritter, Financial Aspects of Normalizing Cuba's International
Relations: The Debt and Compensation Issues, in TRANSITION IN CUBA: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY 501, 559-60 (Lisandro Perez ed., 1993).
14 2 Id. at 543.
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consistent with the country's means. The Cuban government
will thus need to exercise great care and creativity when
confronting the difficult and highly volatile expropriation
issue. Those seeking to assert property claims must remain
vigilant in order to take appropriate action on short notice.
They must also exhibit good faith and flexibility in working
with the U.S. and Cuban governments to achieve a fair and
reasonable resolution of their claims.
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